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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J. KLINGER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Supreme Court
Case No. 930120

EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,

Utah Court of Appeals
Case No.

Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs.
GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN
DOE WILSON, individually and
dba WILSON CALDER,

Priority No. 15

Third-Party Defendants
and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, 78-2a-3(2)(k).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
a.
negligence,

Is the claim of Appellees, based upon a theory of
barred

by

reason

of

the

four-year

statute

of

limitations since Appellees discovered, or should have discovered,
that a problem existed at the time of their receipt of deeds in
1

1980? Did the trial court error in not finding that the action was
time barred in the face of Appellees' testimony that they were
aware of the discrepancies between the deeds and the uniform real
estate contracts but decided not to investigate the problem?

The

standard of review is one of correctness giving no deference to the
trial court's conclusion of law.
b.

Did the trial court use an improper measure of

damages in calculating the amount to award to Appellees? Was there
a proper causal connection between the negligence of Appellant and
the damages claimed by Appellees? The standard of review is one of
correctness giving no deference to the trial court's conclusion of
law.
c.

Did the trial court improperly exclude from evidence the

business diary kept by John Stafford, one of the surveyors, who had
died a few months before trial?

The standard of review is one of

correctness giving no deference to the trial courtf s conclusion of
law.
d.

Did the trial court properly conclude that pre-judgment

interest should run from the date of the reconveyance?

The

standard of review is one of correctness giving no deference to the
trial court's conclusion of law.
e.

Did the trial court properly assess costs in the case

including the filing fees of the prior appeal, the witness fees in
the first trial in which Appellant was not a party, the witness
fees for experts of Appellant, the transcript of the first trial,
printing costs of the briefs in the first appeal, photocopies, etc?
2

The standard of review is one of correctness giving no deference to
the trial court's conclusion of law,
f.

Did the trial court properly deny the objections to the

findings of fact and conclusions of law doing so without even a
hearing on the objections particularly when the trial court had
issued only a very brief conclusory minute entry, without any
findings of fact, on its decision of the case?

The standard of

review is presently believed to be whether the trial court abused
its discretion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This dispute revolves around a parcel of property located in
the Strawberry River Estates in the Uinta Basin.

This parcel was

purchased by the Appellees in June, 1971, by means of a Uniform
Real Estate Contract.

This contract contained a legal description

of the property which differed by 1000 feet from that which the
Strawberry River Estates had represented to the Appellees as being
lots 30 and 31.

In early 1972, Glen H. Calder, Appellant, signed

a survey certificate which contained the same legal description as
provided in the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
In

October

of

1980,

Appellees

transferring title to the Appellees.

received

a

Warranty

Deed

The legal description in that

deed differed from that in the Uniform Real Estate Contract by 10
feet.

The Appellees recognized the error, but did not investigate

as to why the legal description had changed.

3

After the value of

the

property

significantly

increased

during

the

national

oil

crisis, the Appellees sold by contract the property with the legal
description contained in the October, 1980, Warranty Deed, but
represented to the purchasers that they owned the property which
they intended to purchase, that being lots 30 and 31.
Upon the purchasers' discovery of the discrepancy, they filed
suit to rescind the contract.

Appellees filed a third-party action

against Calder based on negligence with respect to his signing of
the survey certificate.

Calder moved for summary judgment and was

dismissed from the action.

The trial court ruled in favor of the

purchaser rescinding the contract.

The Appellees appealed the

trial court's granting of summary judgment, which the Utah Supreme
Court overturned and remanded for trial with respect to the thirdparty action.
The third-party action claimed that Calder was negligent in
signing a certificate which did not reflect that which Appellees
believed to have purchased.

Appellees claimed that Calder was

therefore liable for all damages sustained by Appellees including
the losses associated with the rescinded sale.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Trial Court

After being remanded from the Utah Supreme Court, the case was
heard on June 23, 1992, in the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya.
Those who testified on behalf of the Third-Party Plaintiffs
were Eugene E. Kightly and Harry D. Kreis, Third-Party Plaintiffs;

4

Bing Christensen, a certified surveyor; and Gerald Wilkerson, a
real estate agent.
Those who testified on behalf of the Third-Party Defendants
were Glen Calder, Third-Party Defendant and Floyd Ostler, survey
crew member.

Also, the testimony of Merrill Gunderson, another

survey crew member, was proffered by Robert F. Babcock, attorney
for Calder, as being cumulative and supportive of the testimony of
Floyd Ostler.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court continued the case
pending the hearing of closing arguments.

The closing arguments

were argued on October 28, 1992. The court issued its decision in
this case by Minute Entry dated November 19, 1992, in favor of the
Third-Party Plaintiffs.
Third-Party Plaintiffs prepared and filed with the court
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law along with a Judgment in
conjunction with this case. The court signed on December 23, 1992,
the Judgment and the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.
Calder prepared and filed an objection to the proposed findings and
requested a hearing regarding the proposal.

The court summarily

denied Calder's objections and also denied the request for hearing.
Glen H. Calder, filed a Notice of Appeal in the Third District
Court on March 2, 1993. On or about April 13, 1993, Calder filed
its Docketing Statement with this Court.
C.

Designation of the Parties

Eugene E. Kightly, Helen L. Kightly, Harry D. Kreis, and Peggy
R. Kreis Barnett, Third-Party Plaintiffs in the trial and Appellees
5

here, and hereafter throughout this brief, will be referred to
collectively as Appellees.
Glen H. Calder, Third-Party Defendant

in the trial and

Appellant here, and hereafter throughout this brief, will be
referred to as Calder.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
a.

In June 1971, Appellees entered into a Uniform Real

Estate Contract as buyers with Strawberry River Estates as seller
for certain property.1
b.

Appellees were shown the property by the representatives

of the seller while being shown a plat map prepared by Ed Allen
having the property divided into lots. It was Appellees' intent to
purchase lots 30 and 31.2
c.

Calder had no involvement preceding the purchase of the

property by Appellees.

Appellees purchased the property prior to

any surveying work being done.3
d.

When the property was purchased by Appellees the Uniform

Real Estate Contract did not refer to the lot numbers on the plat
map that had been shown to Appellees.

Rather, the Contract spoke

in terms of a metes and bounds description.4

1

Ex. P-6.

2

Exs. P-4, P-5, P-6;
471 - 472.

Kightly R. 373, 420;

Kreis R. 467,

3

Kightly R. 411 - 412; Kreis R. 475 - 476; Calder R. 517.

4

Exs. P-5 and P-6.

Kightly R. 406; Kreis R. 468 - 469.
6

e.
part

Apparently, whether through intent or inadvertence on the

of

the

seller

Strawberry

River

Estates,

there

was

a

discrepancy between the metes and bounds description used in the
Uniform Real Estate Contract and the dimensions shown on the plat
map for lots 30 and 31.

One of the dimensions that should have

read 1320 feet actually was typed to read 320 feet.

Obviously

leaving the 1 off of the figure of 1320 created a 1000 foot
discrepancy.5
f.

Approximately ten months later Strawberry River Estates

contacted John Stafford and two others working with him requesting
that they perform certain survey work including surveying the
corners of lots 30 and 31. Strawberry River Estates hired and paid
Stafford and his associates for the work performed.6
g.

Appellees did not hire nor pay Calder for placing the

stakes in the corners of lots 30 and 31.

This information was

contained in Stafford's diary which was excluded by the trial
court.7
h.

Appellees testified they hired Calder to survey according

to the metes and bounds description from the Uniform Real Estate
Contract. Appellees testified that they did not give the surveyors
a plat map. Appellees testified that they contacted the surveyors

5

475;

Compare Exs. P-3, P-5, and P-6.
Calder R. 515 - 516.

6

Stafford Diary.

7

Stafford Diary.

Kightly R. 377; Kreis R.

Ostler R. 528 - 533, 539, 541 - 542.

7

in their Duchesne office, next to the office of their attorneyDavid Sam, in the Spring of 1972.8
i.

Calder and Ostler testified that there was no office in

Duchesne at this time.

Each of the surveyors were doing business

out of their own homes.9 Ostler testified that he did not perform
any survey in the Strawberry River Estates using a metes and bounds
description, but only staked property corners off of a plat map.10
j.

Both the surveyors and the Appellees testified that the

survey was performed on a Saturday.11

Appellees agree that the

property was staked as to the corners of the plat map.12
k.

Calder had no involvement in the initial survey work

performed by Stafford or his associates.

Calder had been a

surveying instructor for Stafford and his associates at the civil
engineering department at Brigham Young University.

During this

time (1972) Stafford and his associates were working toward being
licensed professional surveyors.

When there was something that

needed to be signed by a licensed professional surveyor, Stafford

8

Kightly R. 377 - 378, 407, 416 - 417, 421 - 422. Kreis R.

9

Calder R. 494; Ostler R. 533, 537.

469.

10

Ostler R. 529 - 532.

11

Kightly R. 378 - 380. Kreis R. 458 - 459. Ostler R. 528 -

12

Klinger R. 409.

529.

8

and his associates would perform the work and request that Calder
review the work and sign the document for ten percent of the fee.13
1.

Some time after the initial survey work was performed at

the request of Strawberry River Estates to establish the corners of
lots 30 and 31, Appellees approached the surveyors requesting that
a map be prepared.14

Mr. Kightly testified that he received the

certificate of survey in October of 1972.15
m.

The detail in the certificate prepared by Stafford and

his associates properly showed the location of the property in
relation

to the section lines.

Appellees

apparently

did not

carefully review the plat map signed by Calder which was prepared
by Stafford

and his associates.

The detail on that plat was

inconsistent with what was shown on the initial plat map of Ed
Allen which served as the representation and basis for the purchase
by Appellees.16
n.

In 1980, Appellees received the warranty deed along with

two quit claim deeds each containing a different legal description
than was in the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The description of

320 was changed to 330 which is exactly one-fourth of a section.
At this time, someone had apparently concluded that some type of

13

Calder R. 487, 493, 503, and 517.

14

Kightly R. 415.

15

R. 424.

16

Ex. P-l.

Ostler R. 536 - 537,

540.

Kightly R. 409 - 410.
9

Calder R. 495 - 498.

error

had

been made

and

adjusted

the

legal

description

to

compensate for the "error."17
o.

In 1980, the Appellees also received a special warranty

deed also referring to the changed legal description of 330 feet.18
p.

In 1980, Mr. Rightly was, in fact, aware of the error in

the legal description between the Uniform Real Estate Contract and
the subsequent deeds but made no effort to investigate the reason
for the error.19
q.

Appellees discovered through the receipt of the two quit

claim deeds and the subsequent special warranty deed that the legal
description was different than what was shown in the Uniform Real
Estate Contract and in the plat signed by Calder.

A reasonable

inquiry into the discrepancy between the legal descriptions would
have led to the discovery of the conflict between the description
of lots 30 and 31 and the metes and bounds description, but the
Appellees did nothing.20
r.

In the ensuing years, Appellees continued to use the

property as represented to them by the seller as lots 30 and 31,
which was staked by Stafford and his associates, when in reality
what had been sold to them under the Uniform Real Estate Contract

17

Ex. D-l and D-2.

18

Compare P-6 and P-8.

19

Compare P-6 and P-8.

20

Compare P-6, P-8, D-l, and D-2. Rightly R. 412 - 413, 427

Rightly R. 413 - 414, 427.

Rightly R. 412 - 413, 427 - 428.

- 428.
10

was actually 1000 feet to the east and what had been deeded to them
in 1980 was 990 feet to the east.21
s.

Twelve years after Appellees purchased the property and

eleven years after the survey work was performed for Strawberry
River Estates and the plat drawn for Appellees, and after the value
of the property in that area substantially increased, Appellees
decided to sell the "property."
ultimate purchaser

in 1983 that

Appellees represented to the
the

"property" was where

the

sellers had represented it to be and where the stakes were set,
both of which were based upon the unrecorded plat showing lots 30
and 31.22
t.

Appellees claim to have shown Klingers, the ultimate

purchaser, the plat signed by Calder.23

The Uniform Real Estate

Contract between Appellees and Klingers, however, did not use the
description from Calder's map.
"corrected"

legal

description

Instead, the contract used the
that

appeared

in

the

deeds

to

Appellees in 1980.24
u.

Appellees have alleged on several occasions during the

litigation that Calder used the wrong reference point in performing
the survey.

Kreis testified that Appellees collectively concluded

21

Exs. P-5, P-6, and P-8.
Calder R. 515 - 516.
22

Ex. P-7.
R. 461 - 462.

Rightly R. 377; Kreis R. 475;

Klinger R. 388 - 390.

23

Kightly R. 389.

24

Compare P-l, P-6, P-7, and P-8.

Wilkerson R. 436. Kreis

Wilkerson R. 437.

11

Kreis R. 461.

Kightly R. 390

that the surveyors incorrectly used the quarter marker rather than
finding the northeast corner of Section ll.25
v.

The Klingers brought an action to rescind the sale.

Recision was granted because Appellees did not own the property
that they verbally represented to Klingers that was to be the
subject of the sale.

Appellees have, therefore, reacquired the

property from Klingers and still own the same property.26
w.

Appellees claimed against Calder the loss of bargain of

a sale of property that Appellees never owned. Appellees actually
purchased

the

property

identified

by

the

metes

and

bounds

description and sold according to a "corrected" legal description.
The verbal representations, however, were that Appellees were
selling property in the river bottoms that Appellees had intended
upon purchasing themselves, but in reality did not purchase.
Appellees were most interested in the western property in the river
bottoms because it was most useable.27
x.

The property is worth basically the same at the time of

trial as it was at the time it was purchased by Appellees.

There

was, however, a spike in the real estate prices in the Uinta Basin
area at the time of the oil boom.

It was at that time that

Appellees sold the property to Klingers. The artificial spike was

25

Kreis R. 463, 478.

26

R. 2.

Kightly R. 392 - 395.

27

Exs. P-5, P-6, P-7, P-8. Kightly R. 373, 420.
467, 471 - 472. Wilkerson R. 445.
12

Kreis R.

not reasonably foreseeable as a result of the claimed negligence of
Calder.28
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellees claim that Calder was negligent in signing a survey
certificate that contained a legal description which differed from
what the Appellees believed they were purchasing from Strawberry
River Estates.

In 1980, Appellees knew of an error in the legal

description of their property, but failed to investigate. The four
year statute of limitations as it relates to negligence began to
run at that time. Appellees did not bring this action within the
four year limitation, and therefore, this claim is time barred as
a matter of law.
Appellees' claim of negligence on the part of Calder, if any,
is not causally connected to the damages claimed. Furthermore, the
damages alleged were not foreseeable due to the fact that the value
of the real estate dramatically fluctuated.

The trial court also

awarded damages which were not supported by the evidence.

The

damages awarded were inappropriate, contrary to the evidence
presented at trial, and without basis as related to any negligence
on the part of Calder.
The trial court denied the admittance of John Stafford's
survey diary, a member to the survey crew. Evidence was presented
from the other members of the survey crew which provided adequate
foundation to authenticate Stafford's diary as the one used by
Stafford during the performance of the survey. This diary was kept
28

Exs. P-5, P-6, P-7, P-8.
13

Wilkerson R. 445.

in the normal course of the survey group's business.

The trial

court's denial to admit the diary was erroneous.
The trial court awarded Appellees pre-judgment interest as
part of its decision.

The basis of liability was found to be in

negligence, not contract.

The trial court awarded damages which

were not calculated with mathematical certainty, which is required
when awarding prejudgment interest. As such, the court's awarding
of pre-judgment interest was clearly erroneous.
The trial court also awarded costs to the Appellees. However,
included in those costs were expenses which were not related to
this case, contrary to the evidence and minute entry ruling by the
trial court, and/or not allowed to be taxed as costs by statute and
case law. The trial court's award for these costs is without basis
in the law and clearly erroneous.
The trial

court

further mechanically

adopted Appellees'

proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

This was done

despite the fact that Calder filed objections to said findings and
requested

a

hearing

Furthermore, Appellees

before
filed

the

trial

court

for

a Reply to Calder's

argument.
objections

agreeing to modify some of the findings. However, the trial court
inappropriately adopted the findings without hearing or agreed to
modifications.

14

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CLAIM OF APPELLEES, BASED UPON A THEORY OF
NEGLIGENCE, IS BARRED BY REASON OF THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS SINCE APPELLEES DISCOVERED, OR SHOULD HAVE
DISCOVERED, THAT A PROBLEM IN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THEIR RECEIPT OF DEEDS IN 1980.
In this case, the trial court found that Glen H. Calder, a
licensed surveyor, was negligent in the certification of a survey
of Appellees' property, and Appellees sustained damage as a result
of the negligence.29

In so doing, the trial court errored in not

ruling that the action based on negligence was time barred due to
the fact that the Appellees knew, or should have known, of the
error in 1980, at the latest, thus actuating the four year statute
of limitations.
In a case claiming damage under the negligence theory/ the
action must be commenced within four (4) years as provided in Utah
Code Annotated

§78-12-25(2).

With

respect

to the statute of

limitations and the applicability of the "discovery rule", the
Supreme Court, in a previous appeal from this same case, held that
the discovery rule was applicable and, therefore, the statute of
limitations would begin to run when the party "learns of or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts
which give rise to the cause of action." Klinqer v. Kiqhtly. 791
P.2d

868

(Utah 1990).

With this ruling

and instruction,

Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court.
29

Conclusions Nos. 1 and 2.
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Minute Entry R. 291.

the

At trial, much evidence was introduced indicating that the
Appellees knew or should have known of the legal description error
surrounding the property purchased in the Strawberry River Estates*
When the Appellees first discussed the potential purchase of
property in the Strawberry River Estates, the agents showed the
Appellees a plat map and together walked the property site.30
Subsequently, the Appellees purchased the lots by means of a
Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated June 2, 1971, with the property
legally described by the metes and bounds method.31
In October of

1971, the Strawberry River Estates, Inc.

contacted the Appellees again regarding the potential sale of an
additional ten acres adjacent to the Appellees1 property.

It was

ultimately agreed that Strawberry River Estates, Inc. would include
these ten acres with the original purchase of the Appellees at no
additional cost.32 As such, a new Uniform Real Estate Contract was
prepared in October of 1971, but was back dated to the original
June 2, 1971, purchase date.33
Approximately nine years later, the Appellees received a
Warranty Deed for this property dated October 24, 1980.34

The

legal metes and bounds description on the deed differed from that
found in the Uniform Real Estate Contract used to purchase the
30

Rightly R. 373, 420. Kreis R. 467, 471 - 472.

31

Ex. P-6.

Rightly R. 406.

32

Ex. P-4.

Rightly R. 371 - 374.

33

Ex. P-6.

Rightly R. 376 - 378.

34

Ex. P-8.
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Rreis R. 468 - 469.

property.

The deed indicated that the property commenced

330

rather than 320 feet west of the section line.35
At

the

time

Appellees

received

this

deed,

Mr.

Kightly

testified that he reviewed the deed and noticed that there was a
discrepancy between the legal description contained in the deed and
the legal description in the Uniform Real Estate Contract.36

He

testified that he also received and reviewed two quitclaim deeds at
about

the

same

inconsistent.37

time

and

those

legal

descriptions

were

also

Mr. Kightly testified that he knew there was a

mistake, but "thought it might be just a typographical error."38
However, Mr. Kightly indicated that despite the fact there was an
error, he did nothing to determine why the legal description had
been changed.39
This Court sheds great light relevant to this case in a recent
decision which addressed the statute of limitations and discovery
rule and how they relate to professional negligence.

In S e w v.

Security Title Co., 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah 1993), this Court
cites Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) to help set forth
the general principle that:
statute of limitations are designed to promote justice by
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
35

Compare Ex. P-6 and Ex. P-8.

36

R. 387; 412 - 413; 427.

37

Exs. D-l and D-2.

38

R. 414.

39

R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428.

Kightly R. 412 - 413, 427 -

428.

R. 413 - 414; R 427.
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have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost,
memories
have
faded,
and
witnesses
have
disappeared. . . . [and] mere ignorance of the existence
of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the
statute of limitations.40
With

respect

to

how

the

statute

of

limitations

and

the

discovery rule interrelate, this Court then refers to the Supreme
Court's decision in Klinqer, the case at hand's previous appeal.
As

in S e w ,

this case

relates

discovery rule may be applied

to the circumstance
if there exists

where

the

"exceptional or

unique circumstances".
In S e w ,

this Court

then

stated

that

it

is a

threshold

requirement that the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff did not
know and could not have known that a cause of action existed so as
to file an action within the limitation period.
Provo City Corp. , 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992).

See Warren v.

This Court went on to

state that:
for the [plaintiffs] to benefit from the discovery rule,
and not have their claim barred by the four-year statute
of limitations, the trial court had to find the
[plaintiffs] neither knew of [defendants'] failure to
protect their . . . interest . . . nor should have
reasonably known of this failure until four years before
they filed their lawsuit.41
This Court then went on to analyze the evidence to determine when
the plaintiffs "knew or should have known" of the existence of a
problem.
in

Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court in the previous appeal

determining

that

the

discovery

rule

should

remanded this case back to the trial court.
40

Myers, 635 P.2d at 86.

41

S e w , 218 U.A.R. at 36.
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be

applicable

On remand, however,

the trial court errored

in not ruling

that the statute of

limitations barred Appellees claim.
In the instant case, the trial court made no finding as to
when the Appellees discovered the facts necessary to pursue a cause
of action.42

However, there was ample evidence presented that the

fact were available and easily ascertainable in 1980 when the
Appellees received the warranty and two quitclaim deeds with
differing legal descriptions from the purchase contract.43

In

fact, the Appellees testified that they "discovered" this error in
1980, but did nothing.44

The evidence clearly

supports the

contention that the four year statute of limitations began to run,
at the latest in 1980, when the Appellees testified that they knew
of the error.
Furthermore, the case at hand does not meet the "balancing
test" as set forth in S e w .

When determining whether or not the

discovery rule should be applied, the court must balance the
hardship of the statute of limitations with the prejudice to the
defendant with respect to difficulties of proof due to the passage
of time.
In the case at hand, there was ample opportunity on the part
of the Appellees to bring this action much earlier.

When the

Appellees discovered an error in the legal description in 1980,
they did nothing.

By not investigating, the Appellees allowed

42

See Findings of Facts.

43

Compare Ex. P-6, P-8, D-l, and D-2.

44

Rightly R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428.
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more time to pass.

As such, a total of approximately 14 years

passed from the time the survey certificate was prepared before
this action was brought.
faded over this time.

There is no question that memories have
For example, the Appellees continually

testified that they went to the surveyors office in Duchesne and
requested that the survey be performed.45

This could not have

happened because the surveyors did not have an office in Duchesne
at this time. They were doing business out of their homes, and the
office was not opened until some time later.46
Also, not only have memories faded, but John Stafford, the
member of the survey party who headed up the surveys in this area
and was the principal party involved with the survey certificate,
passed away and was therefore unavailable to testify. Furthermore,
the trial court refused to admit the survey diary of Mr. Stafford
which was made contemporaneously with the disputed events.47

It

is clear that the passage of time has prejudiced Calder in his
defense of this case due to the fact that memories have faded,
responsible parties have disappeared, and key witnesses have passed
away.
Therefore, as of 1980, it is undisputed that a discrepancy in
the legal descriptions existed.
undisputed

that

they

knew

of

Appellees testified and it is
an

error

but

45

Kightly R. 378 - 379; 407; 416 - 417.

46

Ostler R. 533.

47

decided

not

to

See Point III of this brief for the argument related to the
admissibility of the survey diary as a business record pursuant to
Utah Rules of Evidence 803(6).
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investigate.

The four year statute of limitations began to run

from the time Appellees recognized the discrepancy.
Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990).

See Klinger v.

The Appellees should have

discovered, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the facts
which gave rise to the cause of action against Calder.
Appellees did not bring this action until 1986 - more than
four years after Appellees first learned that there was a problem
with the legal description.

The trial court, in the face of

Appellees' testimony that they were aware of the discrepancies
between the deeds and the uniform real estate contracts but decided
not to investigate the problem, ruled in favor of the Appellees.
The trial court errored by not dismissing this action against
Calder as being time barred.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT USED AN IMPROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN
CALCULATING THE AMOUNT TO AWARD TO APPELLEES.
For a party to be entitled to damages under the theory of
negligence, there must be a logical causal connection between the
negligent act of the defendant and the damages claimed by the
plaintiff.

Proximate cause is

,f

[t]hat cause which in natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred."

Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992)

(quoting State v. Lawson#

688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1984)).

No such

causal connection exists between the negligence, if any, of Calder
and the damages claimed by Appellees.
21

Furthermore, when there are other parties whose acts or
negligence contributed to the damage received by the injured party,
each party is responsible only for that damage which he caused, and
not for the damage caused by another. See Utah Code Annotated §7827-40.
a)

Calder did not participate in the preparation of
the documents used to transfer title to the
Appellees.

Appellees claimed against Calder damages from the "loss of the
benefit of the bargain" for a sale of property, the most valuable
of which Appellees never owned.

The Appellees purchased the

property under a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated June 2, 1971.48
The contract provided a legal description of the property which
Appellees purchased.

Appellees testified that this contract, and

the subsequent warranty deed, do not describe the property which
they believed they agreed to purchase.49
The contract was prepared and ownership interests were created
approximately

ten

certificate.50

months

before

Calder

signed

the

survey

Calder had no part in the preparation of the

contract or the deed, the legal transfer of the property.51
According to the Appellees, these documents did not properly
describe the property they intended to purchase.52

The property

48

Ex. P-6.

49

Kightly R. 404; Kreis R. 468 - 469, 474.

50

Ex. P-l; Kightly R. 407.

51

Calder R. 487, 503. Ostler R. 536 - 537, 540.

52

Kightly 377. Kreis R. 475.
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Calder R. 515 - 516.

as described in the contract was 1000 feet farther to the east than
that which was represented to the Appellees by the Strawberry River
Estates.

Therefore,

Calder's

negligence

in

signing

the

certificate, if any, in no way altered what property the Appellees
had already received from the Strawberry River Estates.
b)

Appellees did not use the legal description
contained in the survey certificate in their
attempted transfer of the property to the Klingers.

Both Appellees and Mr. Wilkerson, Appellees' expert, testified
that the valuable property in the location was on the west side of
the creek.53

It

is undisputed,

as described

Appellees never owned this property.

above,

that

the

That property was never part

of the property covered by the Uniform Real Estate Contract nor
part of the property conveyed to Appellees by way of the three
deeds.

Appellees subsequently made representations and "sold" to

Klingers the "property" that Appellees never owned.54
In this sale, the Appellees testified that they did not use
the legal description contained in Calder's certificate, Appellees
instead

used

the description contained

received in 1980 from Security Title.55

in their warranty deed
They were not relying on

the accuracy of the certificate, but were relying on the accuracy
of the warranty deed.

The trial court erroneously found that

Calder, by signing a plat map certificate containing the legal

53

Kightly R. 411 - 412.

54

Kightly R. 411 - 412. Wilkerson R. 442.

55

Compare P-6, P-7, and P-8.

Wilkerson R. 436.
Kreis R. 474 -

475.
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Kightly R. 390.

description contained in Appellees' purchase contract, was liable
for Appellees' loss of the benefit of the sale where the Appellees
used

a

different

legal

description.

Therefore,

no

causal

connection existed. The negligence, if any, on the part of Calder
was superseded and cut off by the negligence of the party who
prepared

the

warranty

deed

containing

a

different

legal

description, the same legal description which ultimately used to
transfer the property to the Klingers.
c)

See Butterfield supra.

The damages claimed by Appellees against Calder
were not foreseeable.

Furthermore, not to mention the fact that it is illogical to
hold Calder liable for Appellees' attempt to sell property which
they never owned, the value of that property was inflated due to an
unforeseeable artificial spike in the real estate market due to the
oil crises.
$5,500.56

The Appellees purchased the property in 1971 for

The value of the land area increased significantly and

the Appellees contracted to sell the property to the Klinger in
1983 for $32,000 on contract.57

Subsequently, the property values

in the area fell back to their initial values and the Klingers were
able to rescind the contract and reconvey the property to the
Appellees.58
As a result, the Appellees are in the same position now as
they were when the purchased the property.

They own the same

Ex. P-6.
Rightly R. 401 - 402. Wilkerson R. 436.
Rightly R. 394 - 395.
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property now, no more, no less, as they purchased in the Uniform
Real Estate Contract dated in June of 1971. The only difference is
that the Appellees have attempted to recoup from Calder the profit
they would have received when they attempted to sell property which
they did not own.
Therefore, it is not foreseeable that Calder could be held
liable for Appellees attempt to sell property not owned by them,
property with a description different than that contained in the
certificate signed by Calder, or property that significantly
increased due to an artificial spike.
d)

The trial court's finding
supported by the evidence.

of

damages

is

not

The trial court found that Calder was liable to Appellees for
damages totaling $29,383.00 as contained in Appellees' Exhibit P-9.
As part of section A. entitled "Loss on Sale/Recision" on Exhibit
P-9, it lists as the selling price $32,000,59 less present value
of $6,000, leaving a loss of $26,000.60

This is contradictory to

the evidence presented at trial.
Appellees' expert witness on real estate, Mr. Wilkerson,
testified that the Appellees had received an offer to purchase the
land for $10,000, but the Appellees, contrary to Mr. Wilkerson's
advice, turned the offer down.61 When asked what the present value
59

The $32,000 was the list
property which the Appellees never
price is inflated when it is used in
the less valuable property owned by
60

Ex. P-9.

61

R. 445, 450.
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price for the more valuable
owned. Therefore, this list
comparison to present value of
the Appellees.

of the property was, Mr. Wilkerson testified that it was worth
$8,000, not $6,000 as stated on Ex. P-9.62
During closing arguments, counsel for Appellees set forth the
damages being claimed against Calder.
incurred

With respect to the losses

from the sale and the present market value of the

property, Appellees' counsel stated:
Mr. Wilkerson, the realtor who sold the property was very
familiar with the area, is still familiar with the area,
and is in real estate, testified that he felt the present
market value of the land is around $8,000. My people
lost the value of their bargain, the $32,000 which they
sold the property for, less the $8,000. which the value
is now $24,OOP.63 (emphasis added)
Therefore, the damages as calculated on Ex. P-9 do not reflect
the evidence presented. Appellees admit in their closing arguments
that the present value of the property is not properly reflected in
Ex. P-9.

As such, the trial court's award of damages was clearly

contrary to the evidence presented at trial.
Appellees had received an offer for $10,000. This appears to
be the most conclusive evidence of market value. Nevertheless, the
judgment must, at a minimum, be reduced by at least $2,000 to
properly reflect the evidence presented,
e)

Conclusion

Accordingly, no logical causal connection has been shown by
Appellees

between

the damages

claimed

negligence on the part of Calder.

by

Appellees

and

any

Appellees were not damaged by

Calderfs negligence in signing the plat certificate, the Appellees
62

R. 448.

63

Closing Arg. pg. 10.
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were damaged due to the negligence of the person who prepared the
Uniform Real Estate Contract which contained a legal description
different that what the Appellees intended and believed they were
purchasing.

The trial court's decision to rescind the contract of

the Appellees subsequent sale of the property was not due to any
negligence on the part of Calder, but was due to the fact that the
Appellees were trying to sell to the buyers property which they did
not, and never did own.

Furthermore, even if Calder were liable,

the evidence presented does not support the amount of damages
awarded to Appellees.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE THE
BUSINESS DIARY KEPT BY JOHN STAFFORD, ONE OF THE
SURVEYORS, WHO HAD DIED A FEW MONTHS BEFORE TRIAL.
The survey diary of John Stafford was offered as evidence at
trial

as

a

business

record.

The

diary

which

was

recorded

contemporaneously as the disputed events occurred would have been
evidence

to

contradict

testimony

of

Appellees

including

that

Stafford was hired by Strawberry River Estates and not Appellees to
perform

the

survey

work.

Further,

the

diary

would

have

contradicted the testimony of Appellees that Stafford was requested
to survey lots 30 and 31 and not the metes and bounds description
from the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The other two members of

the survey crew were present and authenticated the diary.64

64

The

Ostler R. 528, 532 - 533. Proffered testimony of Gunderson

R. 546.
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trial court would
evidence.65

not allow the diary

to be introduced

as

The refusal to allow the diary into evidence was

reversible error. See State v. Bertul, 644 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983).
In

this

case,

the

trial

court

improperly

denied

the

introduction of Mr. Stafford's survey diary as a being a business
record.66

Pursuant to Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence

entitled "Records of regularly conducted activity."

It states:

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, or record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source
of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and
calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit.
In accordance with the above mentioned rule, the diary meets
all of the requirements.

The diary is a written record of events

which was made at the time the acts occurred.

It was prepared by

a person with knowledge of the events, John Stafford.

The diary

was kept in the course of regularly conducted business, which is
the normal practice of the business. All of this information was
presented

by

qualified

witnesses,

Floyd

Ostler

and

Merrill

Gunderson, Mr. Stafford's business parties and actual members of

65

Court R. 508 - 511, 532 - 533.

66

Court R. 510.
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the survey crew at the time the survey diary was made.67 There is
no evidence whatsoever that this diary lacks trustworthiness.
The trial court's ruling to deny the admittance of this diary
may be overturned where the court has abused its discretion. State
ex rel. Marcruez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 1977).
As provided by Rule 803(6), it is necessary that a qualified
person lay the foundation for the records to be entered into
evidence.

In Hansen v. Heath, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1993),

the court addressed the situation regarding "a qualified person."
It that case, the person who prepared the record was not available
to testify. The Utah Supreme Court allowed another witness lay the
foundation for the record.

The Utah Supreme Court stated:

Although Freedman was not Woo's treating physician, rule
803(6) allows any qualified witness to lay the proper
foundation for a record, not just the custodian or the
person who created the record, (emphasis original) Hansen
at 18.
In footnote 17 of the Hansen decision, the Utah Supreme Court also
cites Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.. 939 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1991)
which indicates that under the Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6),
"the person testifying need not have prepared the records nor have
personal knowledge of the accuracy of the information contained in
them."

Id. at 272.

At trial, the foundation for the admission of Mr. Stafford's
survey diary was laid through testimony from Floyd Ostler and the
proffered testimony of Merrill Gunderson as required by Rule

67

Ostler R. 528 - 533. Proffered testimony of Gunderson R.

546.
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803(6).

Mr. Ostler and Mr. Gunderson were members of the survey

crew with Mr. Stafford and were familiar with the diary, and
testified that they had reviewed the diary and it contained
information regarding work they had performed together including
the property disputed in this case.68
This

diary

made

by

Mr.

Stafford

was

made

during

the

performance of surveys recording the activities and jobs performed
by the survey group.69 It was the normal practice of the surveying
group to keep such diaries.70

The trial court incorrectly ruled

that this diary was inadmissible as being hearsay when it should
have admitted the diary into evidence under the business record
exception to the hearsay rule.
Mr. Stafford, the author of the diary, was not available to
testify at trial. Before trial, Mr. Stafford passed away in Alaska
from leukemia.

In any event, the diary, in accord with Utah Rule

of Evidence 803(6), does not require the availability of the
declarant if it was within the regular practice of the business to
retain such diary as shown by the testimony of qualified persons.
A showing that the trial court's acts are "beyond the limits
of reasonability" indicates an abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court. State v. Dunn, 208 U.A.R. 100 (Utah 1993); State
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-240, (Utah 1992).

As such, in this

case, the trial court clearly abused his discretion. As set forth
68

Ostler R. 528 - 533.

69

Ostler R. 532.

70

Ostler R. 532.
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above, there was adequate foundation laid as required by Rule
803(6) and

the trial courts

refusal

to admit

the diary

into

evidence was clearly erroneous.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
FROM THE DATE OF THE RECONVEYANCE.
The case at hand is an action for professional negligence
which is an action in tort.

See Restatement. 2d, Torts, §289

Comment m; Prosser & Keeton §32.

Interest awarded as damages

differs from interest provided by contractual agreement.

Interest

awarded as damages is allowed only to compensate for the delay in
recovery of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled.

See 22

Am.Jur. 2d, Damages §§179, 189 et. seq.
The trial court in this case awarded the Appellees prejudgment
interest from the time the property was reconveyed back to the
Appellees

on

July

30,

1987.71

Prejudgment

interest

has

been

awarded in construction contract or other contract cases where a
court can fix the damages as of a particular time and the amount of
the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy.

Jorgensen

v. John Clay £ Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983).
In a case which is strikingly similar to this case, this Court
determined

that

the

prejudgment interest.

prevailing

party

was

not

entitled

to

In Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown, &

Gunnel1, 784 P,2d 475 (Utah App. 1989), a case which involves a

Judgment R. 304 - 306.
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negligent property survey, the plaintiff claimed damages against
the surveyor for loss of value to the property due to the negligent
survey.

This Court cited the Utah Supreme Court and stated:

[W]here the damage is complete and the amount of loss
fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be
measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed
from that time and not from the date of the judgment. On
the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be
calculated with mathematical accuracy, such as in case of
personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of character,
false imprisonment, etc., the amount of damage must be
ascertained and assessed by the by the trier of the fact
at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is
not allowed, (emphasis added) (citing Biork v. April
Indus. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977)).
This Court goes to state that for damages to be calculated
with mathematical certainty, the damages must be ascertained:
in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow
in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their best
judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past
as well as for future injury, or for elements that cannot
be measured by any fixed standards of value, (emphasis
added) (Price-Orem citing Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. , 88
P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907)).
In analyzing the facts of that case, and the method used by
the trial court in determining the damages, the appellate court
stated:
In particular, damages ascertained by determining the
fair market value of real property before and after the
damage cannot be determined with mathematical precision,
and may be inherently uncertain . . . The damages are not
determinable with mathematical precision, and although
the evidence is sufficient to support the damage award,
it is far too uncertain to support a prejudgment interest
award. (emphasis added) Price-Orem at 482-83.
See also Anesthesiologists Association v. St. Benedict's Hospital,
212 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1993).
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The trial court in this case at hand determined that Calder
was negligent in its signing of the survey certificate.72
court

found

no breach

of

contract.

The

trial

court

The

awarded

Appellees the "Loss on Sale" and calculated the damages by taking
the sales price, less present value of the property.73

The trial

court's use of the present market value of the property is, at
best, an estimation.

Further, the present market value of the

property which was testified

to, and being used

to

calculate

damages, was the value of the property at the time of trial, not
the

value

of

the

property

at

the

time

of

reconveyance.74

Nevertheless, the trial court awarded pre-judgment interest back to
the date of reconveyance.

This method of damage calculation is

inherently

without

uncertain

and

described in Price-Orem.
Orem,

it

is

likewise

mathematical

precision

as

As it was found to be improper in Priceimproper

for

the

trial

court

to

award

prejudgment interest in this case.
Furthermore, the trial court's denial of Calder's request for
hearing with respect to the objections to this award was erroneous.
As such, the trial court errored, as a matter of law, in awarding
Appellees prejudgment interest, and the award must be reversed.

Minute Entry R. 291.

Conclusions of Law R. 302.

Minute Entry R. 291.

Ex. P-9.

Wilkerson R. 448;

Closing Arg. pg. 10.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED COSTS IN THIS CASE
INCLUDING THE FILING FEES OF THE PRIOR APPEAL, THE
WITNESS FEES IN THE FIRST TRIAL IN WHICH APPELLANT WAS
NOT A PARTY, THE WITNESS FEES FOR EXPERTS OF APPELLANT,
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE FIRST TRIAL, PRINTING COSTS OF THE
BRIEFS IN THE FIRST APPEAL, PHOTOCOPIES, ETC.
The generally accepted premise regarding costs is that the
award of costs should be narrowly made to guard against abuse by
those better financially equipped lest the cost of seeking justice
become

prohibitive

for

the

financially

ill-equipped.

Highland

Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1984).
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) does not specifically
define costs, but the generally accepted definition of costs under
this rule includes: "...those fees which are required to be paid to
the court and to witnesses, and for which the statues authorize to
be included in the judgment."
There is a distinction to be understood between the legitimate
and taxable "costs" and other "expenses" of litigation which may be
ever

so

necessary,

Consistent

but

are

not

with that distinction,

properly

taxable

the courts hold

as

costs.

that

expert

witnesses cannot be awarded extra compensation unless the statute
expressly so provides.
Dasakalas, 785 P.2d

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, v.

1112, (Utah App. 1989) citing Frampton

v.

Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980).
In Frampton, the award of costs in excess of those expressly
allowed

by

statute

for service of subpoena,
34

witness

fees and

preparation of model, photographs and certified copies of documents
was improper even though the costs represented the actual expenses
incurred.

The fact that the Utah Supreme Court has on occasion

approved taxing of expense of depositions as costs should not be
taken as opening

the door to other expenses of the character

claimed the instant case. Id.
Appellees' Memorandum of Costs claimed certain items as being
"costs" related to this action.75
the

"costs"

submitted

were

Despite the fact that many of

contrary

to

the

trial

court's

disposition of the case in its Minute Entry, and also contrary to
applicable
Appellees

law,

the

without

trial

court

allowing

granted

Calder

a

these

hearing

costs
to

to

the

argue

the

appropriateness of the costs.76
Witness Fees77
Witness fees in

the amount of $17.00 a day, plus mileage, are

permitted by Utah Code Annotated §21-5-4. However, Appellees only
state names and amounts for each witness. Appellees do not provide
a breakdown as to miles traveled, nor a basis for the necessity of
the witnesses.
However, the most obvious error is that Appellees fail to tell
the court that the witnesses list includes witness compensation
from the first trial in Duchesne County.

75

Listed are Glen H. Calder

Memorandum of Costs R. 292 - 295.

76

Minute Entry R. 291. Calder's Objection R. 307 - 310.
Calder f s Request for Hearing R. 311 - 312. Judgment R. 304 - 306.
77

R. 293.
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and Gerald Condor as receiving witness fees and compensation for
mileage for their testimony in the first trial.78

Calder was not

a party to the trial due to the fact that Calder f s motion for
summary judgment was granted by that court prior to trial.79
Conder

did

not

testify

at

the

trial

before

Judge

Mr.

Sawaya.

Nevertheless, Appellees are attempting to recover these as costs
attributable to this trial.
Therefore, Appellees attempt to recover their costs which were
incurred in a previous trial is wholly inappropriate and should be
disallowed.
Clerk Fees80
Appellees are attempting to recover fees relating to an appeal
from a ruling from the Duchesne County court action.

Appellees

have claimed in their Memorandum of Cost the filing fee for the
appeal.

Appellees argued in closing arguments and included this

cost under item "E. Additional Expenses" as part of its "Schedule
of Damages" which was submitted to the trial court.81
court,

however,

in ruling

in favor

for Appellees

The trial
stated

that

Appellees were entitled only to those damages as set forth under
Items A and B.82

The trial court, therefore, ruled in its Minute

R. 293.
R. 198 - 199.
R. 292 - 293.
Closing Arg. pg. 11; Ex. P-9.
Minute Entry R. 291.
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Entry decision that these filing fees were not to be part of the
j udgment.
The attempt to recover this filing fee from the Utah Supreme
Court

for

the

appeal

of

the

Duchesne

County

action

is

inappropriate, contrary to the Minute Entry of the trial court and
not taxable to the judgment at hand.
Constable Fees83
Constable fees maybe recoverable if they are related to the
action at hand.

However, Appellees have not provided any evidence

that the costs claimed are related to the proceeding before Judge
Sawaya.
Reporter Fees84
The Utah Supreme court has permitted the taxing of the expense
of taking a deposition only if the deposition was taken in good
faith and appeared to be essential for development and presentation
of the case and taken for potential use as trial testimony. See
Frampton.

No such showing has been made by Appellees either by

affidavit or legal memorandum.
Appellees are also claiming as a cost the expense of a copy of
the trial transcript from the Duchesne County trial of which Calder
was not a party.85

It is apparent that this transcript was ordered

to be used by the Appellees on their appeal from the Duchesne

R. 293.
R. 294.
R. 198 - 199.
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County decision•

There was no need for this transcript for the

prosecution of this case.
Appellees are attempting again, to shoehorn in costs from the
Duchesne County action and appeal. The transcript is not a taxable
cost related to this litigation.

As was stated above, the trial

court has already denied the Appellees' claim for expenses relating
to the first appeal.
Miscellaneous Costs86
Appellees attempt to recover the costs of printing its
appellate brief relating to the appeal from the Duchense County
rulings.

Once again, the trial court in its Minute Entry denied

the appeal expenses.
Also, Appellees' claim for an unknown United Parcel Service
charge,

a

request

for

a

certificate

of

incorporation

photocopies of unknown origin and value to this case.

and
These

charges are either contrary to the trial court's Minute Entry or
not appropriate to this case and are not permissible under Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d).
Although a trail court may have discretion in regard to the
allowance of certain costs, it also has a duty to guard against any
excesses or abuse in the taxing thereof.

Id. at 773-774.

The

trial court in this case utterly refused to consider Calder's
objections to Appellees' Memorandum of Costs and Request for
Hearing.87

Appellees served by mail its Memorandum of Costs on

86

R. 294.

87

R. 319.
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December 18, 1992.

Before Calder even had filed his opposition,

the trial court signed the Judgement awarding the costs to the
Appellees on December 23, 1992.88

Clearly this is an abuse of

discretion on the part of the trial court and contrary to the
Minute Entry ruling made by the trial court.89

As such, the award

of these costs must be reversed.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CALDER'S OBJECTIONS TO
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DOING SO
WITHOUT EVEN A HEARING ON THE OBJECTIONS PARTICULARLY
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT HAD ISSUED ONLY A VERY BRIEF
CONCLUSORY MINUTE ENTRY, WITHOUT ANY FINDINGS OF FACT, ON
ITS DECISION OF THE CASE.
At the conclusion of the trail the court issued a brief minute
order regarding its findings in which it stated in pertinent part
that:

1. Calder was negligent in the survey of the property which

resulted

in

plaintiff

selling

Plaintiff(sic) has sustained

wrong

property

damages; and

2.

and

that

[Appellees] are

granted judgment per [Appellees1] schedule (Exhibit P-9) Items A
and B. in the amount of $29,383, interest and costs.90
The trial court, however, does not state in its minute order
anything

about

interest, etc.

any

particular

findings

of

fact,

prejudgment

On December 18, 1992, counsel for Appellees mailed

88

R. 304 - 306,

89

R.

90

R. 291.

291.
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its proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.91

On

December 23, 1992, the trial court signed Appellees' prepared
Findings of Fact without change.92
court

also

signed

the

Judgment

On the same day, the trial
prepared

by

includes, for the first time, the provision
interest.93

Appellees

which

for prejudgment

The court signed the documents before the time period

for Calder to object or debate the findings had expired.
On December 29, 1992, Calder served his objections to the
Findings of Fact and objections to the form of the Judgment,
specifically

to

the

included

costs

and

to

the

prejudgment

interest.94

Calder at the same time requests a hearing for

argument as to the Findings of Fact, Judgment and Memorandum of
Costs.95

On January 25, 1993, counsel for Appellees serves his

Reply to Calder's objections to the Findings of Fact, Judgment and
Memorandum of Costs.96

Of interest, Appellees respond only as to

the findings of fact, but does not contest the objections to the
cost or the judgment.
On January 29, 1993, the court issues a minute entry order
stating the Calder's request for a hearing has been submitted and

R. 303.
R. 296 - 303.
R. 304 - 306.
R. 307 - 310.
R. 311 - 312.
R. 313 - 318.
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the court stated that the findings and judgment reflect the courts
decision and no hearing would be granted.97
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration clearly
states the following:
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on the
merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing
the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court
finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is
frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided, (emphasis added)
It is clear that in the case at hand that Calder's request for
hearing should have been granted.
decision

on

the

Findings

of

Not only did the court make its

Fact

prior

to

reading

Calder's

opposition, the trial court did not incorporate in its minute entry
order some of the crucial and offensive sections of Appellees1
judgment order and

findings of

fact such as the pre-judgment

interest.98
Two cases in this jurisdiction that discuss this matter are
Bover Co. v. Lignell. 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977) and Alta Industries
v. Hurst, 205 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 1993).
In Bover the court stated:
while we do not recommend that the trial judge
"mechanically adopt" the findings as prepared by the
prevailing party, we certainly do not find such to be the
fact in this case. After the proposed "findings" were
submitted by defendants' counsel, the plaintiff filed
97

R. 319.

98

R. 291, 296 - 303.
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objections and proposed amendments which were argued
before the trail court who ultimately adopted the
findings as submitted. The discretion of adopting the
findings as submitted to the trail court is exclusively
in that court as long as the findings are not contrary to
the evidence, (citing Merrill v. Bailey & Sons, Co., 106
P.2d 255 (Utah 1940).
The Alta court further discussed the Bover case noting that
The court took an active role in the preparation of the
findings. In so concluding we relied on the fact that
prior to adopting the prevailing party's findings the
court considered the opposing party's objections and
proposed amendments and conducted a hearing on the
propriety of the proposed findings.
In Alta the trial judge took an active role in preparation of
the findings than did the trial judge in Bover.

In Alta not only

were objections field and a hearing conducted, but the trial judge
prepared an initial memorandum decision containing findings of fact
before

instructing

Steelco

consistent with his decision.

to

prepare

additional

findings

It is clear that trial court in Alta

did not mechanically adopt the findings.

The appellate court,

therefore, found that the findings were entitled to the normal
deference

accorded

by Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure

52(a) on

appeal.
In the case at bar, the trial court undertook none of the
actions taken by the courts in Alta or Bover.

Instead, the trial

court signed the Findings of Fact before even reading Calder's
objections,

and

ultimately

refused

to

grant

Calder's objections to the judgment

form,

Clearly

instance,

the

trial

court,

in

this

discretionary powers.
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a hearing

costs and
has

as

to

findings.

abused

its

CONCLUSION

The claim of Appellees, based upon a theory of negligence,
should have been dismissed by reason of the four-year statute of
limitations.

Appellees

testified

that they discovered

that a

problem existed at the time of their receipt of deeds in 1980.

The

trial court errored in not finding that the action was time barred
in the face of this testimony along with the various documents.
This ruling should be reversed, and this action against Calder be
dismissed.
The

trial

court

used

an

improper

measure

calculating the amount to award to Appellees.
as

presented

above,

there

was

no

proper

of

damages

in

Due to the factors
or

logical

causal

connection between the negligence of Appellant, if any, and the
damages claimed by Appellees.
support

Furthermore, the evidence does not

the amount of damages awarded.

As such, the damages

awarded against Calder must, at a minimum, be reduced to reflect
the evidence presented.
The trial court improperly excluded from evidence the business
diary kept by John Stafford, one of the surveyors, who had died in
Alaska a few months before trial. The diary meets the requirements
as set

forth

in the Rules of Evidence

as a business

record.

Furthermore, adequate foundation was laid by the testimony of the
witnesses. The diary provides contemporaneous recorded evidence to
contradict Appellees' claims.

This Court must remand this case to

trial with the direction to admit this diary into evidence.
43

The trial court improperly awarded pre-judgment interest in
this case running from the date of the reconveyance. Pre-judgment
interest can only be awarded when the damages can be calculated
with mathematical certainty. The award in this case against Calder
was based in negligence, and calculated using estimated property
market value.

Case law clearly indicates that such calculations

are not sufficiently certain to justify pre-judgment interest. As
such, this Court must reverse the trial courts awarding of prejudgment interest.
The trial court improperly assessed

costs in this case

including the filing fees of the prior appeal, the witness fees in
the first trial in which Appellant was not a party, the witness
fees for experts of Appellant, the transcript of the first trial,
printing costs of the briefs in the first appeal, photocopies, etc.
The trial court erroneously awarded cost contrary to the Minute
Entry decision. This Court must reverse the trial court's awarding
of costs which are contrary to the Minute Decision and those not
provided as being taxable by statute.
The trial court improperly denied the objections to the
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The trial court did so

without even granting a hearing on the objections.

This is

particularly egregious when the trial court had issued only a very
brief conclusory minute entry, without any findings of fact, on its
decision of the case.

As such, the action must be remanded for

hearing on Calder's objections.
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*

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^ °
/

day of August, 1993.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

By:
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Robert F./Babcock
Brian J. Babcock
Attorneys for Appellant

ADDENDUM
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EUGENE E. a HELEN L KIGHTLY AND
HARRY D^a PEGGY R. KREIS,0 ,^

<&
w

4
<?.,

jrl/2mr%bor

[ S 990.0
> S*cH, t

.Wwl
u
V\

2

4<XO ACRES

Eo*
m

\n t

j

N.

I

320.0
K £ Coc
L8YV.U&U

\f2-County Rood

.

• '

J~

V

IS

•bar

S/2*rtbar

Certificate of Surrey
.

T # Glen'H'# Caldor, do hereby certify that I am
a Registered Land Surveyor in the State of Utah, and
that the plat described hereon portraya a aurvey made
by XLM or under my direction.' I further certify that
the above plat correotly ahowa the true dtrnenalona of
the property aurveyed and of the improvements located
thtrfion; and further that there are no encroachments
on said property*
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fcSTATli CONTRACT

UINITUKJML JULAL,

"This is a legally binding form, if not u n d e r s t o o d , seek c o m p e t e n t a d v i c e . "
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this

by and between

? » L _ day of

f-VB*

, A. D., 19 7 1

t

Strawberry River Estate8, Inc,

hereinafter designated as the Seller, and
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of

Eug»ne E . & H e l e n I .
ffig

P l ^ r e e Avenue

K i g h t l y & H a i r y P . & Peggy R.

Ogden

5171 Morr Mont Drive

Utah

KPBIS

3 9 3 ^ 6 5

Salt Lake City, Utah

277-3765

-tJL,

2 . . WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agTees to purchase the following described real property, situate in
the countv of
Duchegne
.
t s t a t e of Utah, to-wit:
ADDRESS

More particularly described as follows:

-#

Beginning 990 • South of the Suuth line of Section 11, Township U South, Range
8 West, USM, to center of Red Creek, Thence West 132*!/-Thence South 660 1 , Thence Eejfet
1320 f , Thenceforth 165 f , Thence East 1320 f , Thence North 330 1 , Thence West 1320 f f
Thence>^i]^i§fl65, to beginning point at center of Red Creek. Consisting of Thirty
(30) acres and no more.

3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of

Thousand Five Hundred Fifty

* 1 ^

-nniw <f 5»550«00

payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order

3421 S o u t h

50 E a s t

Bountiful,

Utah

strictly within the following times, to-wit: Thirteen Hundred
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of j

(| 1.300.00

4i^t)vJ»W

\

84010
}

shall be paid as follows:

$86.19 or more per month payable on the l e t day of each month commencing
on July 1, 1971, and payable each rconth thereafter until paid in f u l l .

Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the

day of

*>UI1B

^ ^g

4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the
principal. Interest shall be charged from

June

*t

ly/1

o n a jj

unpaid portions of the

purchase price at the rate of
±±£i£
per cent (
~
<fc) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made.
6. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
(J.

T

It is
is undprstnnH
t h a t there
there presently
nrA««mflv *>vi<:tc
an obligation
nhlicratinn against
atrainef said
eot/4 property
nrnnartu in
in favor
favnr of
/if .
It
understood that
exists an

1,020.00

as o{

May 1, 1971

•

. with an unpaid balance of

7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following —
.
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed

&lgflX

percent

(
" 9c) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the Aggregate monthly installment
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages.
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in obtaining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above.
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all / taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these^'premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
t h a t there are no assessments againsVsaid premises except the following:

None

Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the paymeni 01 nis oongauons agamsi saia property.

JUBB 1 w. 1971

2. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after

—

IS. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a cornacceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or %
to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may'appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him.
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance
iums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either
em, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced
paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per
h until paid.
L5. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon
premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition.
IC. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make

. .
Thirty
days thereafter, the
payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within
2—
..
Seller
shall
have
the
right,
upon
failure
of
the
Buyer
to
remedy
the
default
within
five
days
after written notice,
r, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies:
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with
the land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at wil! of the Seller; or
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the. Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage, and pass
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession
of the said premises during the period of redemption.
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
18. In. the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or
•red to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the
> by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit
he amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the payLs herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such a time as such suspended
nents shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
es to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
e described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
r through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount
le purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the
i of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer.
20. It i« hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property
s present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with
•ence to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herehat the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
ccrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
sdy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
therwise.
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, sucjrs, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year

^?nveth7nrln;nrp of *
in/jne presence of,.*
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"This is a legally binding form, if not understood, seek competent advice "
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this

2nd

day of

» A - D-» l

$tn€

g

7/ »

h\ and between _
hereinafter designated a." the Sell* i,

and <$-ymc £ $ Helm L KighUff & * W y fl<? fluffy % K**tU

hereinafter designated as the Buyer,

of ?l& Tlenct Asmtie Qgdm. iV/rri J92-MI5
?/7/ / W flbni tUtve. Soli Lake CJUb^Uich.

277-176$

2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in
the county of

Lhtr*fnf

, State of Utah, to-wit:
ADDRESS

Mon> particularly described as follows:

Beginning, ai a fkUvt 320 / W Wedi and 990 £eei SouA at ike NoxAmAi
( OAfl&l OL Section It. TounAtp 4 SowA and %*** 8 VIvO. U.S.IK,
tkenct
fiW 26kO fevL ihmot South 660 Uei, iktnce. J W 26W feet,
Atnce.
NOA& 660 fjtei io foirvt of. Beplnrunp.
(pnALeUng. of /o/tfy acted.

3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of

Thousand Flue Hundred Fipbf and no/100 - • —
Dollars <* Sj 550*00 >
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order _
IRJ6 W S flhJn .y., W / lake Q*jf$ H*.Mtt5
strictly within the following times, to-wit:

TfuAJCm

MwvUed

and no/fOO

ca^h, the receipt of which is. hereby acknowledged, and the balanci of $

- - - -—

%• 2^0*00

(iJ^JQO^OO

)

shall be paid a* follows

$86.19 OA mote pe/t monJk payable, on Ae / ~ i clou of. tack mordh axrmencinp
on July /, 19719 ond payable each monik AeAjeapteA until paid In faLL

Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the .

2nd

fane

— day of _

, wjl_.

»l Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the
principal. Interest shall be charged from

$Un£

2p

1971

on all unpaid portions of the

purchase price at the rate of t/ohx
per cent (—!•___
%) per annum. The Buyer, a t his option at anytime,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, auch excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made.
5. I t is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
6

It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in lavoi of _

.
$

flcmchfA, (Inc,—.
I, OPT).00
, as of

V^J/pff

. . _ _______ with an unpaid

balance of

% I, 1971

7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following .
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed

f/y^^

percent

( _ a & c — % ) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the pnncipol due hereunder ha» been reduced to the amount of any such
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages.
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obligations outstanding a t date of this agreement against said property, i t shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in obtaining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above.
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

_ _

4_ttt£

.

_ _ _

_____ _

.

_

P-6

,

„.

„..„.

w .*..-..—

«..«** •«**«» wi«v «c wm not o e n u i u n ine payment 01 bis obligations against aaid property.

12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after —

ff«* /, /?7/

13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on aaid premises insured in a company acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $
ind to assign aaid insurance to the Seller as his interests may'appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him.
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance
remiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either
f them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced
nd paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of aaid sums at the rate of 54 of one percent per
lonth until paid.
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon
aid premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition.
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make
days thereafter, the
ThJbdty
ny payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within
eller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies:
___ Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice,
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take
possession of aaid premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improvements and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with
the land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage, and pass
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah, and have the property aold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession
of the aaid premises during the period of redemption.
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or
ferred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the
me by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit
the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the payents herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such a time as such suspended
yments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
rees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
ove described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount
the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the
rm of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer.
20. It i« hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property
its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with
erence to aaid property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto

ntnr\^

21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herethat the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
nedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
otherwise.
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, sucsors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHERECxF/theyiaid parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year
it above written.
/y
/ * *
C a — J L , . ^ . , Ofa.
&O£OAM4,
Inc.
•ned in the presence
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Mail tax notice t o .

WARRANTY DEED
EUGENE E. RlLNlNi

MM 1 III I

Of
S a l t Lake C i t y
CONVEY
and WARRANT

RIGHTLY, HARRY D, KRE1S and
• County of

>ARNETT,
grantor s
, State of Utah, hereby

S a l t Lake

to

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL J . KLINGER, husband and w i f e , as j o i n t t e n a n t s and
n o t as t e n a n t s in. common, w i t h f u l l r i g h t s of s u r v i v o r s h i p ami nnt. as t e n a n t s
i n common.

grantee
for the sum of
— _ DOLLARS,

of
- • - TE N -

a n ::i o th e i g o od 01

t h e following described tract
State of Utah:

ni€i i i l c i a 1 i ( i i i -

of land in

County,

Duchesne

B e g i n n i n g a t a p o i n t 330 f e e t West and 990 f e e t South of the N o r t h e a s t Corner of
S e c t i o n 1 1 , Township 4 S o u t h , Range 8 W e s t , U i n t a h S p e c i a l b a s e & M e r i d i a n , t h e n c e
West 2640 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 660 f e e t ; t h e n c e E a s t 2640 f e e t ; t h e n c e North 660
f e e t t o t h e poiiil u! b e g i n n i n g .
SUBJECT t o a l l e x i s t i n g e a s e m e n t s and r i g h t s - o f - w a y •
EXCEPTING t h e r e f r o m a l l o i l , g a s , and m i n e r a l r i g h t s ,
TOGETHER w i t h a l l improvements and a p p u r t e n a n c e s t h e r e t o

belonging.

SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a p e r p e t u a l easement and r i g h t - o l way hh.O f e e t wide
f o r road p u r p o s e s o v e r and a c r o s s t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e Grantor and p r o p e r t y of
S e c u r i t y T i t l e Company, Trustese named as Grantor i n t h a t c e r t a i n S p e c i a l Warranty
Deed d a t e d October 2 4 , 1 9 8 0 , r e c o r d e d Apri1 1 0 , 1 9 8 1 , i n Book A-81 page 4 9 2 , Duchesne
C o u n t y , U t a h , and a l s o o v e r and a c r o s s the s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y a t a l o c a t i o n t o be
m u t u a l l y d e t e r m i n e d and a g r e e d by t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o , or t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s and a s s ^ n *
t o t h e end t h a t a t a l l t i m e s t h e r e w i l l be a v a i l a b l e tjfr-ijflftpy t i e s or t h e i r
s u c c e s s o r s or a s s i g n s r e a s o n a b l e road r i g h t - o f ^ w j g f i f c f ^ P B l W M s and e g r e s s t o and
from the a d j o i n i n g p r o p e r t y o f S e c u r i t y T i t J f i f c < ^ p a R H t J i t ^ e , and t h e l a n d s
d e s c r i b e d and c o n v e y e d h e r e i n .

WITNESS, the hand
July

of said grantor

Signed in the Presence of

f

/f 7/

, this
A. D, 19

day of

&fmtfi*&/4
Sugepe E. Kiglh t l

Helen L. Kightfy

CS

^ ^ z&c
"&&

JS>

SPECIAL 'WARRANTY DEED
(CORPORATE FORM)

/ (>'/%

ms**.^^
&J*>cs<<^

Cc/.

SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee, a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, through
or under it to
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS and PEGGY R. KREIS
BARNETT, a l l as tenants in common.
grantee
of
Salt Lake City, Utah
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable considerations
County,
the following described tract of land in
Duchesne
State of Utah:
BEGINNING a t a point 330 feet West and 990 feet South of the Northeast
Corner of Section 1 1 , Township 4 South and Range 8 West, Uintah Special
Meridian; thence West 2640 f e e t ; thence South 660 f e e t ; thence East 2640
f e e t ; thence North 660 f e e t to the point of BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO easements, covenants, r e s t r i c t i o n s , r i g h t s of way and reservations appearing of record and taxes for a l l property t a x e s .
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a perpetual easement and right of way 66
f e e t wide for road purposes over and across the property of the Grantor
and also over and across the subject property at a l o c a t i o n to be mutually
determined and agreed by the parties hereto or t h e i r successors and
assigns t o the end that at a l l times there w i l l be a v a i l a b l e to the p a r t i e s
or t h e i r successors or assigns reasonable road right of ways for ingress
and egress to and from the adjoining property of Grantor and the lands
described and conveyed herein.

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto
affixed by its duly authorized officers this 24th day of
October
t A.D., 19 B0

1LL4J11M.

:KARLES G. MILLER
(CORPORATE SEAL) -

Secretary.

• *-•

SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee
By

JjLA
CRAIG F. TH0MSEN

^..^S^M^xJi^
Vice

President.

STATE OF UTAH/."
County of Salt Lake

ss

On the
24th
day of
October
,A.D. 1980
personally appeared before me CRAIG F. THOMSEN and
CHARLES G. MILLER
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said CRAIG F. THOMSEN
is the Vi coresident, and he, the said
CHARLES G. MILLER
is the Secretary
Df SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee, and that the within and foregoing instrument
was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors
•tnd said
CRAIG F. THOMSEN
and
CHARLES G. MILLER
»ach duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed
s the seal of said corporation.

AM
vly commission expires .J?.?-/A.5./.81_

...ft.J&^u^
,

,

Notary Public,

My residence is Salt Lake City, Utah

KIGHTLY. et al vs. CALDER

SCHEDULE OF DAMAGES

A.

Loss on Sa 1 e/Recisiofi:

Selling price 40 acres at $800 per acre
Less: Present value 4 0 acres at $150 per acre

32,000,00
(6,000.0
$ 26,000.00

B.

CIosi nq L1 osLf-» I

Commission to Rec
Title Insurance
Document fee

r

3,^uu.uo
163.00
2 0.00
j , «3 o J • 'L v

$
C.

Payment t o

Klinaers:

(,"»H t 1 e m e n l

Re-Survey -

111

hnji^iiii >ni

, i i JI l . | , M I i

Christensen

300.

TOTAL

E.

29,383.00

$ 41,683.00

Additional Expenses:
Appeal Costs

Summary Judgment dismissed

Filing fees, preparation
Attorney fees

Briefs,
$

5,630,30

? in DISTRlCTCOURTDUCHESiii
CTATCAruTHU

9V_CH?W OUNTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF ,
STATE OF UTAH

ROGER K.MABETI, Clerk

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL J,
KLINGER, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

.4

EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
R. KREIS BARNETT, UNITED
AGENCY, INC., and GERALD
WILKERSON,

JUL

6*8?\

L.
PEGGY
FARM
W.

Defendants.

Civil No. 86-CV-68D

The Court having heard and reviewed the evidence and having
duly considered that evidence in light of the cases cited by
counsel, now finds:
1.

The legal description set forth in the deeds and

Trust Deed did not include the property west of the creek,
2.

Plaintiffs and Defendants were mistaken as to the

location of the property described in the contract documents.
3.

The mistake was a material one, it being shown by

the evidence that the parcel of land known as the Conder property was used by all parties during their occupation of the
premises, and
4.

Plaintiffs relied upon the representations of

Defendants and their agent as to the location of the property and
upon the survey in making their decision to purchase the real
estate.

0l4ii

on

I ] c i :i ntd ffs 1 iai ; e enci imbei :: eci 1 ;he property to the State

5

of Utah for the conservatioi I loan.
6

Tl le work done on tl le creek did not benefit the

slibject pi: oper t^
The Cour t, there fore # coneludes:
1.

p1a I n t i f f s a r e ent i 11ed to res c ind the c o n t r a c t on

the bet sis <> f the mi i t::i ial nii stake of fact. si lb ject !
::: .c tl: ICE condi t i on
stated below.
2.

Rescission

is properly granted only if the p r o p e r t y

is rerunvcyt'd in Ijcftiidaii I •> f i n ul <ni» n in i nitl»I'diic *e.
3,

1> 1ai n 11 £ f s a r e e n t i 11ed to r e c o v e r t h e a m o u n ^ ^ f

t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e , "taxes paid o f $ 1 1 , .1 r> 7 , 0 1 a n d i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n
in t h e s u m oi :, ,!, 11» 'J M l , f"ofdlin«j ', I " ( i1'. M
4,

Plaintiffs are n o t entitled to recover from D e f e n -

d a n t s any portion of t h e con?'^v.":f ! r T loan.
Base,.

n thp foreaoing T -. . - ,

Law, i t :- !;• r^.
1
property desc: ,, .

IE 'ac !: a :i: id Coi ICII isi oi: :i s of

•: icred:
m s
n

s

h a n reconvey by warranty deed the

the contract documents, fr ee ai id clear » £

any encumbi a^c , -^ts . • hall replace fences or fence posts or
other

improvements wliich were on the subjec t property in July,

1983.
2.

- .nveyance a 5; s(.-f. *"•;•: i"

Plai nti ffs si -

-

AJ> vi I s accomplished,

•- M ^ent. n u m ana after that date

in the sum of $13,851-59.

014 1

3.

If the property cannot be reconveyed free of

encumbrance within ninety (90) days, rescission will not be
allowed and Defendants will be entitled to their remedies under
the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note.
DATED this

day of June, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

Q^&t*t^€^> c>-> uLj^i

cc:

Rick J. Sutherland
E. H. Fankhauser

014o
00150

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Defendants
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J, KLINGER, husband and wife,

*

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

Civil No.

86 CV 68D

fc vs
5
•J

EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN
L. KIGHTLY, et al.

J

V

J

Defendants,

o
M
J>
D

Third Party Defendant having heretofore filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment and the Court having considered the

Q
UJ

pleadings and memoranda, denied the Third Party Defendants1
Motion for Summary Judgment; and thereafter the Third Party

UJ

Defendants filed a Motion to Reconsider its Motion for Summary
Judgment; and each of the parties having submitted additional
Memorandums; and the Court, having reconsidered Third Party
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment; and having reviewed the
pleadings and memoranda, made its ruling as of June-J7^; 13.87;
7 ^ DISTRICT COUF tDUCHES;:,
now, in accordance therewith:

CC72 r ^- 7
019 U

ROGER* .ttASEn.ClcK

198

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Court's
previous ruling denying Third Party Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment is set aside.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Third Party
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the Third
Party Complaint against Third Party Defendant is dismissed.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

c^/S'r

day of .September, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

DENNIS L. DRANEY
DISTRICT JUDGE

'—rt

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
ma iled to R-ick J. Sutherland, Attorney for Plaintiff, 3760
Highland Drive, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 and to
Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendants, 185 South
State, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 in accordance with
Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice on this

-2-

//

day of September, 1987,

019 :;

'

00199

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
KIGHTLY, EUGENE E
PLAINTIFF
VS
CALDER, GLEN H

CASE NUMBER 910902670 CV
DATE 11/19/92
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STH

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE HAVING HERETOFORE BEEN HEAARD BY
THIS COURT AND THE MATTER OF THE COURT'S DECISION HAVING BEEN
TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW
BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES RULES AS FOLLOWS:
1. DEFENDANT CALDER WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE SURVEY OF
THE PROPERTY WHICH RESULTED IN PLAINTIFF SELLING WRONG
PROPERTY AND THAT PLAINNTIFF HAS SUSTAINED DAMAGES.
2. PLAINTIFF IS GRANTED JUDGMENT PER PLAINTIFF'S
SCHEDULE (EXHIBIT P-9) ITEMS A AND B. I.E. $29,383,
INTEREST AND COSTS.
CC: E.H. FANKHAUSER
ROBERT F. BABCOCK

00291

i,-., hb J&.5-

it r n

E. H. FANKHADSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Defendant/Third
Party Plaintiffs
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

21

A3ofH ,SZ

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, *
Plaintiff,

5m%3b

*

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

*

vs.
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,

Civil No.
*

910902670 CV

Judge Sawaya

Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and dba
WILSON CALDER,

*
*

Third-Party Defendants.

COSTS
CLERK'S FEE:
Duchesne County Clerk
filing fee - Third Party Complaint

50.00

00292

Duchesne County Recorder
Certificate of Survey
District Court/Supreme Court
filing fees - Appeal
Duchesne County Clerk
Certified copies
District Court - filing fee
Change of Venue

12.00

155.00
1.20
20.00

CONSTABLE FEE:
A. Fernlund - serve Summons
Wm. Mclff - serve Subpoena
A. Fernlund - serve Subpoena

11.25
5.25
11.25

Wasatch County Sheriff
serve Subpoena

7.00

Wasatch County Sheriff
re-serve Subpoena - Christensen

7.29

WITNESS FEE AND MILEAGE:
Glen H. Calder

48.50

Gerald Conder

48.50

Bing Christensen

17.00

Gerald Wilkerson

17.00

Gerald Wilkerson
additional mileage

15.00
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REPORTER FEES;
Milo Harmon - Transcript

690.00

ASO Professional Reporters
Depo copy - Kreis

52.40

MISCELLANEOUS COSTS:
Alexander's Print Shop Printing of Briefs re Calder

81.28

United Parcel Service - ship
records

1.80

Lt. Governor - Certificate of
Incorporation

10.00

Photocopies 120 at $.15

18.00

TOTAL COSTS

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

$ 1,279.72

)
: ss.
)

The undersigned, being first sworn on oath states that he is
the Attorney for Third Party Plaintiffs in the above entitled
action; he is informed relative to the necessity for incurring the
above listed costs and disbursements and states that the Memorandum
is correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

E. ^H. FANKHAUSER
Attorney for Third Party Plaintiffs

00294

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

JL

day of

December, 1992.

j£*.

zr
NOTARY J^JfeLIC
^T
Residing
in
Salt
Lake
County,
Utah
Lag i:
My Commission Expires: SV///V<^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendant, 254 West
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this

/^

day of December, 1992.

<?&t/Z?LU'tfc

/ _ - V.
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Third Judicial iUiSirict

DEC 2 3 1992
E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Defendant/Third
Party Plaintiffs
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

SACT LAKE COUNT/

By-

>3pirty Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, *
Plaintiff,

*

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

*

EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,

*

Civil No.

*

Judge Sawaya

Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs,

910902670 CV

*
*

vs.
*

GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and dba
WILSON CALDER,

*
*

Third-Party Defendants.

The Complaint of the Third Party Plaintiffs against the Third
Party Defendants, came on for a non-jury trial at a regular term of
the above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, June 23, 1992, the
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Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding.

The Third Party Plaintiffs

were present in person, except Peggy Barnett, and represented by
their attorney, Ephraim H. Fankhauser. Third Party Defendant, Glen
H. Calder was present in person and represented by his attorney,
Robert F. Babcock.

Witnesses were duly sworn and testified. Each

of the parties presented evidence which was adduced and received by
the Court.

At the completion of the trial, the Court continued

the matter pending presentation of closing arguments.

The matter

was then argued on October 28, 1992 and submitted to the Court for
its decision.

The Court, having taken the matter of its decision

under advisement,

having reviewed

the pleadings and evidence

presented, notified the respective parties of its ruling and
decision by Minute Entry dated November 19, 1992.

The Court,

being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause, finds as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Third Party Plaintiffs, all related to one another,

purchased by Uniform Real Estate Contract in June, 1971, a parcel
of real property comprising 30 acres from Strawberry River Estates
located in Duchesne County, Utah, described by metes and bounds
(Exhibit P-3).
2.

The thirty (30) acre parcel originally purchased had a

"T" configuration with approximately 20 acres situated west of Red
Creek and approximately 10 acres East of Red Creek.
2
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3. In the fall of 1971, Third Party Plaintiffs were contacted
by representatives of Strawberry River Estates about the fact that
the 30 acre M T" shaped property they purchased had left two 5 acre
plots on each side of the 10 acre section East of Red Creek which
could not be sold separately.
4.

Strawberry

River

Estates

extended

to

Third

Party

Plaintiffs an option to even up the 10 acres East of Red Creek to
a 20 acre parcel or trade the 30 acre parcel they had purchased for
other acreage in a different location.

Third Party Plaintiffs

opted to take the two 5 acre parcels, increasing the total acreage
to 40 acres, approximately 20 acres West and 20 acres East of Red
Creek.
5.

Third Party Plaintiffs received a handwritten agreement

that referenced the 40 acre plot as Lots 30 and 31 based upon an
unrecorded plat that had been prepared for Strawberry River Estates
by Edmund W. Allen.

(Ex. P-4 and P-7).

6. Third Party Plaintiffs received a new Uniform Real Estate
Contract in October, 1991 which was back dated, describing the 40
acre parcel by metes and bounds.
7.

(Ex. P-6)

Although Third Party Plaintiffs had been shown the

approximate location of the 40 acre parcel, they made inquiry of
Strawberry River Estates about surveying the property.

Third

Party Plaintiffs did not know any other property owners who had had
their

property

surveyed.

Because

of

their

concerns

and

reservations about the property description in the new Uniform Real
3
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Estate

Contract,

they wanted

to

establish

the

location

and

boundaries of their property.
8.

Acting

on

information

given

by

representatives

of

Strawberry River Estates, Third Party Plaintiffs (the Kightlys)
contacted

a surveyor at the

Defendant, Wilson Calder.

Duchesne

office

of Third

Party

Mr. Kightly asked that the subject

property be surveyed to establish an exact location and boundaries,
leaving a copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. P-6) with
the metes and bounds description of the 40 acre parcel.
9.

The Kightlys and Mr. Kreis went to the property and

observed the survey crew placing re-bar stakes at the corners of
the 40 acre parcel.

They walked the property at that time,

observing the location of the access road which was part of the
original 30 acre plat and were shown where the corner stakes were
placed by the survey crew of Third Party Defendant.
10. A Certificate of Survey was received later dated May 15,
1972 signed by Third Party Defendant, Glen H. Calder, showing the
location of the 40 acre parcel with approximately 20 acres West and
20 acres East of Red Creek.

(Ex. P-l)

Mr. Calder certified that

the plat on the Certificate of Survey, portrayed the survey that
was made by him or under his direction, which representation based
on the evidence was false and untrue.

Mr. Calder testified he

signed the Certificate of Survey as a favor to former students.
That he never went to the site of the subject property at the time
the survey was performed or before signing the Certificate.

The

4
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persons who did the survey were not licensed to do surveys in the
State of Utah.

They used the signature of Mr. Calder to get

around the Utah License law.

The persons who did the survey

claimed they were in business with Mr. Calder and the Certificate
of Survey

(Ex. P-l) indicates that it was done by Wilson and

Calder1s office in Duchesne, Utah.
11.

Third Party Plaintiffs occupied and used the subject

property for a period of years.

They planted trees and grass and

repaired the fence along the county road.

They placed wood fence

posts on the South boundary West of Red Creek and metal fence posts
on the South and North boundaries East of Red Creek, relying on the
survey and the corner markers.
12. Third Party Plaintiffs listed the property for sale with
a realtor, Gerald Wilkerson, Farmer Bureau Agency.

The property

was sold to Klingers in July, 1983 for $32,000.00 (40 acres at
$800.00 per acre).

Klingers were taken to the subject property by

the realtor on two or three occasions, utilizing the Certificate of
Survey.

Third Party Plaintiffs were present on one of these

occasions and in reliance on the Certificate of Survey, Klingers
were shown the location of the corner markers that had been placed
by the survey crew.

Klingers purchased the property and were

given a Warranty Deed containing the legal description by metes and
bounds confirmed by the Certificate of Survey.
13.

Some time in the early part of February, 1985, the

Klingers contacted Mr. Wilkerson, the realtor, informing him that
5
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there was a problem with the boundaries.

Third Party Plaintiffs,

Rightly, were contacted and informed that there was a mistake with
the survey.

Based on the metes and bounds description, the West

boundary of the property was actually a few feet West of Red Creek
and was off approximately 1,000 feet.

The buyers, Klingers,

brought suit to rescind the purchase of the property.

Third Party

Plaintiffs were ordered to re-pay the Klingers and the subject
property was reconveyed to sellers July 30, 1987.

The recision

and reconveyance occurred at a time when property values had
substantially decreased from a high in 1983 to the time of recision
and reconveyance.
14.

Third Party Plaintiff's as a direct result of the

Klingers recision of the purchase and reconveyance of the property,
suffered damages and loss in the amount of $29,383.00.
15. Based on the evidence, the Court finds that Wilson Calder
was not a corporation but a partnership at the time Mr. Calder
signed the Certificate of Survey.
16.

The Court finds that the actual placing of the corner

markers did not square with the legal description in the Uniform
Real Estate Contract (Ex. P-6) given to the surveyor and shown in
the Certificate of Survey.
17.

Third Party Plaintiffs relied upon the expertise and

professional qualifications of Third Party Defendants at the time
they requested their property to be surveyed.

That they relied

upon the Certificate of Survey in the sale of the property to the
6

00301

Klingers.
18. Third Party Defendant had a duty to survey and locate the
subject property correctly which he failed to do.

The damage and

loss suffered by Third Party Plaintiffs was a direct result of the
failure of Third Party Defendant to survey and correctly locate the
boundaries of the subject property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Third Party Defendant, Calder, was negligent in the survey
of the property, which resulted in Plaintiff selling the wrong
property.
2. Plaintiffs sustained damage and loss as a direct result of
Third Party Defendant's negligence.
3.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment against the Third

Party Defendant for damages and loss in the amount of $29,383.00,
together with interest and cost.
DATED this

A^—

day of December, 1992.

BY THI/COURT;

I
\
JAll£S S . SAWAYA
DISTRICT JUDGE

00302

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendants, 254 West
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, in accordance
with Rule 4.504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, on this
111 ~"~ day of December, 1992,

WniUiU^

8
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Third Judicus; iucact

DEC 2 3 1992
E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Defendant/Third
Party Plaintiffs
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

t£y J*«ferk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J- KLINGER, husband and wife, *
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

*

Civil No.
vs.

*

EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,

*

Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs,

*

910902670 CV

Judge Sawaya

*

vs.
*

GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and dba
WILSON CALDER,

*
*

Third-Party Defendants.

The Complaint of the Third Party Plaintiffs came on for trial
at a regular term of the above entitled Court, pursuant to notice,
June 23, 1992, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding.

Third

nr.304

Party Plaintiffs were present and represented by their attorney,
E. H. Fankhauser.

Third Party Defendant, Glen H. Calder, was

present and represented by his attorney, Robert F. Babcock.
Witnesses were sworn and testified and evidence was presented and
adduced by the Court.

The matter was argued to the Court on

October 28, 1992 and submitted for determination and decision. The
Court, having taken the matter under advisement, having reviewed
the pleadings and evidence presented, and being fully advised in
the premises, and having made and entered its Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law, now, therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Third Party
Plaintiffs be and are hereby awarded judgment against the Third
Party Defendant, Glen H. Calder, for the amount of $29,383.00,
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from
July 30, 1987, the date of reconveyance of the subject property to
Third Party Plaintiffs, in the amount of $15,915.80, together with
costs in the amount of $ 1,279.72.

That this judgment is to bear

interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry until
paid in full.
DATED this

day of December, 1992.

BY THE COURT: ,

7AM&3 S. SAWAYA
DISTRICT JUDGE

^*
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendants, 254 West
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, in accordance
with Rule 4.504(2), Code of Judicial Administration,
/^

on this

day of December, 1992.
J

y */-^

//
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Robert F. Babcock #0158
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendant Calder
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 531-7000

DEC

;tr.

3! 8 us AM *92
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J. KLINGER, husband and wife,
Plaintiff,
vs.

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT CALDER f S
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT/THIRD
PARTY PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM
OF COSTS

EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 910902670CV

vs.
Judge Sawaya
GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and dba
WILSON CALDER,
Third-Party Defendants.
Third-Party Defendant Glen Calder, by and through counsel,
objects to the proposed Findings of Fact, the proposed form of the
Judgment, and the Memorandum of Costs submitted by Defendant/Third
Party Plaintiffs subsequent to the entry of this Court's Minute
Entry.
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

A new finding of fact, between #1 and #2, should be

entered stating as follows:

00307

Prior to purchasing any property, Third Party Plaintiffs were
shown the property by representatives of Strawberry Estates
using a plat prepared by Edmund Allen that referenced parcels
by lot numbers including lots 30 and 31.
2.

Proposed #6 should be corrected to read as follows:

Third Party Plaintiffs received a new Uniform Real Estate
Contract from Strawberry Estates in October, 1971, which was
back dated to June, 1971, describing a 40 acre parcel by meets
and bounds that was represented bv Strawberry Estates to be
the same as lots 30 and 31 from the Edmund Allen map.
3.

Between #6 and #7 a new finding should be included that

states as follows:
In reality, the meets and bounds description in the Uniform
Real Estate Contract was off by 1000 feet from what was
described by lots 30 and 31 in the Edmund Allen map. Further,
the meets and bounds description in the Uniform Real Estate
Contract was off by 1000 feet from what Third Party Plaintiffs
believed they were purchasing from Strawberry Estates.
4.

Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #7 on the basis

that it is not supported by the evidence at the trial and is not
found in the court's minute entry.
5.

Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #8 on the basis

that it is not supported by the evidence at the trial and is not
found in the court's minute entry.
6.

Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #10 on the

basis that it is not supported by the evidence at the trial and is
-2-

00308

not found in the court's minute entry,

Third-Party Defendant did

not sign the certificate "as a favor to former students."
persons who did the survey were qualified to do surveys.
unsupported by the evidence to state:

The
It is

"They used the signature of

Mr. Calder to get around the Utah License law."
7.

Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #14 on the

basis it does not itemize the damages as found by the court.
8.

Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #15 on the

basis that it is not supported by the evidence, is outside the
scope of the Complaint and is outside the issues that were
litigated; i.e., the corporate status of Wilson-Calder was never
litigated, the "alleged" partnership was never served or even
claimed to have been served, never filed a responsive pleading in
the case, nor made any kind of appearance in the case.
9.

Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #16 insofar as

it states that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was "given to the
surveyor."
OBJECTIONS TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
Third-Party Defendant objects to the following costs of the
Memorandum of Costs:
1.

The "cost" of the Certificate of Survey.

2.

The filing fees of the appeal as well as the costs of the

transcript plus the copying of the appellate briefs from the first
trial were not granted by the appellate court and should not be
granted now.
3.

Certified copies of something from Duchesne County Clerk.
-3-
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4.

Service of subpoenas to witness in the first trial that

did not involve Third-Party Defendant or in subpoenaing experts for
Third-Party Plaintiff.
5.
that

did

Witness fees and mileage for witnesses in the first trial
not

involve

Third-Party

Defendant

or

in

subpoenaing

experts for Third-Party Plaintiff.
6.

The cost of the copy of the deposition of one of the

Third-Party Plaintiffs.
7.

The miscellaneous

costs not

mentioned

above

are not

properly taxable.
OBJECTIONS TO THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT
Third-Party Defendant objects to the form of the judgment as
it establishes the date for interest to run from July 30, 1987,
which was not found by the court, rather from the date of the entry
of the judgment.

In addition, Third-Party Defendant objects to the

costs included on the basis of the objections specifically noted
above.
DATED this IT

day of December, 1992.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

By:Robert ti^rf&XlA
F. Babcock
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT/THIRDPARTY PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF COSTS to be mailed, postage prepaid, to
E.H. Fankhauser^ 243 East 400 South, #200, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this J&Jrday
of December, 1992. /}
,
_
j , ,
rfb-calder.obj
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Robert F. Babcock #0158
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Third-PartyDefendant Calder
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 531-7000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J. KLINGER, husband and wife,
REQUEST FOR HEARING
Plaintiff,
vs.
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 910902670CV

vs.
Judge Sawaya
GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and dba
WILSON CALDER,
Third-Party Defendants.
Third-Party Defendant Glen H. Calder, by and through his
counsel of record, Robert F. Babcock, of and for the law firm of
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, hereby requests the Court for a hearing on its
Objections to Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Memorandum of Costs
submitted concurrently herewith.
DATED this

cA

day of December, 1992.
WALSTAD
WALSTAD &
& BABCOCK
BABCOCK
By:
Robert F. Babcock
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING to be mailed, postage prepaid, to
E.H. Fankhauser* 243 East 400 South, #200, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this 2frk day of December, 1992.

10-37-calder.req

-2-

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Defendants/Third
Party Plaintiffs
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, *
Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,

*

REPLY TO THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS•
OBJECTION TO THIRD PARTY
PLAINTIFFS1 FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, JUDGMENT
AND MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
Civil No.

Defendants/Third Party
Plaintiffs,

910902670 CV

Judge Sawaya
*

vs.
GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and
d/b/a WILSON CALDER,

*
*

Third Party Defendants.

Third Party Plaintiffs1 by and through their attorney of
record, E. H. Fankhauser, hereby reply to the Objection of Third
Party

Defendant,

Calder, to

the

proposed

Findings

of Fact,

nn^n

Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Memorandum of Costs in the order
in which they appear, as follows:
1.

The request of Third Party Defendant to insert a new

finding in the proposed Findings of Facts does not constitute an
objection to an existing Finding of Fact and therefore should be
denied and rejected.

In the alternative, Third Party Plaintiffs

do not object to the Court adding an additional Finding after
paragraph 3 stating as follows:
After purchasing property, Third Party Plaintiffs were shown
a Plat by representatives of Strawberry River Estates proposed
to have been prepared by Edmund Allen that referenced parcels
by lot numbers including lots 30 and 31.
2. The objection of Third Party Defendant to proposed Finding
#6 is a mis-statement of the facts and evidence presented to the
Court.

The wording

suggested by Third Party Defendant

is

objectionable to Plaintiff after the words metes and bounds. Third
Party Plaintiffs would not object to additional wording, provided
it reads as follows:

By metes and bounds, which description

purported to be the same as Lots 30 and 31 from the Plat.

The

evidence presented at the time of trial is inconclusive as to
whether or not the Plat shown to Third Party Plaintiffs was in fact
the Edmund Allen Plat or a copy of some other Plat prepared by
representatives

of Strawberry

River Estates.

Further, the

description in the Uniform Real Estate Contract purported to be the
same as the description for Lots 30 and 31 to comprise the 40 acre
parcel as opposed to the 30 acre parcel originally purchased.
2

3.

Paragraph 3 of the Objection to Findings of Facts,

Conclusions of Law of Third Party Defendant is not in reality an
objection but a request that new findings be added to the purposed
Findings and therefore should be denied.

Should the Court

determine that the Third Party Defendant be entitled to additional
findings, Third Party Plaintiffs would request that the wording of
a new finding between 6 and 7 state as follows:
Unknown to Third Party Plaintiffs, the metes and bounds
description in the revised Uniform Real Estate Contract was
off by 1000 feet as determined by the survey of Mr.
Christensen. That this error should have been discovered by
Third Party Defendant, Calder, at the time the survey
requested to be performed was performed, which the Third Party
Defendant failed to do.
4.

Third Party Defendants objection to proposed Finding #7

is without merit and therefore disputed on the basis that the
testimony of both Gene Rightly and Harry Kreis was uncontradicted
with regard to the reason for wanting a survey.

The objection

should be denied.
5.

Third Party Defendants objection to Finding #8 on the

basis it is not supported by evidence is disputed and denied in
that the testimony of Gene Kightly and the evidence submitted was
basically uncontradicted.

Third Party Defendant's objection

should be denied.
6.

Third Party Defendant's objection to paragraph 10 of the

Findings, based on a claim it is not supported by evidence is
disputed and denied.

The witnesses produced by Third Party
3
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Defendant, including the testimony of Third

Party Defendant,

supported the Finding that the persons who performed the actual
survey were not licensed to do surveys in the State of Utah.
7.

Third Party Defendant's objection to paragraph 14 of the

Findings is without merit in that it is not necessary to itemize
damages found by the Court as long as the total amount of the
damages stated in the Findings is equal to and in harmony with that
of the Court.
8.

This objection should be denied.

Third Party Defendant's objection to paragraph 15 of the

Findings on a claim that it is not supported by evidence is
disputed and denied.

The evidence presented

at trial was

uncontradicted and confirmed by Mr. Calder and his attorney to the
effect that Wilson-Calder was a partnership, was not a corporation
at the time of the alleged survey and was only in the process of
incorporating.
9.
Findings

This objection should be denied.

Third Party Defendant's objection to paragraph 16 of the
is without merit or substance.

The evidence and

testimony of Gene Kightly was uncontradicted.

Mr. Kightly

testified that he gave to the surveyor a copy of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract with the metes and bounds description.
In that a majority of the objections to the Findings of Facts
submitted by Third Party Plaintiffs to the Court are without
substance and merit, the Court should deny Third Party Defendant's
objections except as agreed to by Third Party Plaintiffs, and award
to Third Party Plaintiffs the costs and attorney's fees necessarily
4
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incurred in responding to Third Party Defendants objections.
The Third Party Defendants Objections are without merit or
substance and should be denied.

The Objections on the part of

Third Party Defendant to the Findings of Fact and the form of
Judgment take on the appearance of an attempt to hinder and delay
the speedy process of processing the judgment to collection.

This

would constitute a violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, entitling the Court to impose sanctions against the
Third Party Defendant and his counsel by assessing as costs
attorney's fees incurred by Third Party Plaintiffs in connection
with these Objections.

Third Party Plaintiffs request the Court

impose sanctions and award to them their attorney's fees incurred
in connection herewith.
DATED this

^ S

day of January, 1993.

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Attorney for Third Party Plaintiffs

00317

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendant, 254 West
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this

J*^

day of January, 1993.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
KIGHTLY, EUGENE E
PLAINTIFF
VS
CALDER, GLEN H

CASE NUMBER 910902670 CV
DATE 01/29/93
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STH

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT CALDER'S REQUEST FOR HEARING HAVING
BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501. COMES NOW
THE COURT AND STATES AS FOLLOWS: FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT REFLECT
THE COURTS DECISION. OBJECTIONS ARE DENIED - NO HEARING
GRANTED.
CC: E. H. FANKHAUSER
ROBERT F. BABCOCK
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Third Judicial District

FEB

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Defendants/Third
Party Plaintiffs
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

h 1993

SALT LAKE C .
s^LTLAKec^...:-:v
5.ij*.y urefK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, *
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING OBJECTIONS TO
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND JUDGMENT

vs.

*

EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,

*

Defendants/Third Party
Plaintiffs,

*

*

Civil No.

910902670 CV

Judge Sawaya

vs.
GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and
d/b/a WILSON CALDER,

*
*

Third Party Defendants.

Third

Party Defendant's Objection to Findings of Facts,

Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pursuant to provisions of Rule 59,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, having been submitted to the Court

0D3?O

pursuant to Rule 4.501(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration;
and Notice to Submit for Decision having been filed with the Court;
and the Court, after considering the Objections of Third Party
Defendant,

request

for

hearing,

the

Reply

of

Third

Party

Plaintiffs, and being fully advised in the premises and having
submitted a Minute Entry decision pursuant to Rule 4.501, Utah Code
of Judicial Administration, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Findings and
Judgment submitted by Third Party Plaintiffs, reflects the Court's
decision.

Third Party Defendant's Objection to the Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and request for hearing are
denied.
DATED this

* /

day of February, 1993.

BY THE ^OUfeT

JAJE&S S . SAWAYA
DISTRICT JUDGE

2

po 3

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to Robert F. Babcock,Attorney for Third Party Defendant, 254 West
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this
day of February, 1993.

3~^~
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Vff^fUjiOtte-x.

3

00*390

I

Robert F. Babcock #0158
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
x Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
> 254 West 400 South, #200
^ Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
v
(801) 531-7000
Y OLE?

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT B. KLINGER and
KAROL J. KLINGER,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs,

Trial Court No. 910902670CV
Judge Sawaya

vs.
GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE
WILSON, individually and dba
WILSON CALDER,
Third-Party Defendants.
Notice

is

hereby

given

that

Third-Party

Defendant

and

Appellant Glen H. Calder appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the
final Order executed by the Honorable James Sawaya on February 4,
1993, regarding the above-referenced matter, which denied a hearing
on Third-Party Defendant's Objection to Third-Party Plaintiffs'
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment which was
entered against said Third-Party Defendant on December 23, 1992.
Appellant Glen H. Calder also appeals from the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment.

00326

DATED this

7

day of March, 1993.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

Robert F. Babcock

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be mailed, postage prepaid, to E.H.
Fankhauser at_JL43 East 400 South, #200, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this £7^day of March, 1993.

10-38-calder.not
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. CLINGER
CAROL J. CLINGER
Plaintiffs,

)

Transcript of:
Closing Arguments

vs.
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY
Dfifendant.

EUGENE KIGHTLY, et al.

1

Case No. 910902670

)

3rd-Party Pits.

)

vs.
GLEN H. CALDER, et al.

)

^rd-Party Defts.

The

above-entitled

)

cause

of

action

came

on

regularly for hearing before the Honorable James S. Sawaya,
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Wednesday, October
28, 1992.
APPEARANCES

For the Plaintiff:

E.H. FANKHAUSER, ESQ.
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant:

ROBERT F. BABCOCK, ESQ,
Salt Lake City, Utah

1

that was the problem there.

Had they followed the

2

description, found the reference, as Mr. Christensen did,

3

we wouldn't have been in this lawsuit.

4

Now we have alleged damages.

There is no

5

question that the property was sold by my people to the

6

dingers at $800 per acre, and that was 40 acres, for

7

$32,000. Mr. Wilkerson, the realtor who sold the

8

property was very familiar with the area, is still

9

familiar with the area, and is in real estate, testified

10

that he felt the present market value of the land is

11

around $8,000.

12

bargain, the 32,000 which they sold the property for,

13

less the 8,000, which the value is now 24,000.

14

My people lost the value of their

In addition to that, they incurred costs when

15

they sold the property.

They had to pay title insurance

16

of $163, and this is on our Exhibit 9-P.

17

real estate commission of $3200, and they paid document

18

recording fees of $20, for a total of $3,383. They

19

incurred costs with Mr. Christensen to re-survey the

20

property, the first time $200.

21

do it a second time because someone had removed or picked

22

out some of the stakes that Mr. Christensen put in, for a

23

total of $300.

24

($27,883), to which interest should be added at the

25

statutory rate of 10 percent.

They paid a

He had to go back out and

This comes to damages of $27,683

10

Now, we are asking in addition to that,
consequential damages which flow directly from this
negligence, which was the cost of the lawsuit with the
dingers and the cost to go to the Supreme Court, which
we show at $5,630.30.

In addition, we have had to pay

$12,000 cash to settle the suit with the dingers,
bringing our totals to approximately $45,313.30
($45,513.30).
The last item which we addressed at the close
of evidence, I move to amend the pleadings to include
Wilson & Calder as a partnership and include the
partnership under its name.

I did that under Rule 15.

All of the evidence was to the effect that Mr. Calder and
Mr. Wilson were in a partnership, not a corporation at
the time this occurred.

The fact that their certificate

shows it is Wilson & Calder would indicate a partnership,
and under Rule 15 the Court has discretion to grant that
amendment where there is no prejudice here.

And Mr.

Calder was here, he had all of his people here, he
defended this action, and let us amend to sue under the
partnership name.
THE COURT: Didn't you do that?

Didn't you sue

them as a partnership?
MR. FANKHAUSER:

I thought I sued him as

"Calder d.b.a. Wilson & Calder.M
11
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE COPY AND CORRECT COPY OF THE
ATTATCHED BRIEF, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID TO THE
FOLLOWING:
EPHRAM H. FRANKHAUSER
243 EAST 400 SOUTH, #200
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
DATED THIS

DAY OF AUGUST, 1993

